

F. BOOK REVIEWS

X: TAYLOR, GEN. D. H. 68-148

8 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. Herewith is General Maxwell D. Taylor's, The Uncertain Trumpet (Harper's) in which he calls for improvements in strategy planning and favors what he calls the strategy of "Favorable Response", as against the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation."
3. The book contains no references to CIA, and no criticisms of U.S. intelligence either in general, in particular agencies, or on specific substantive questions of Soviet intentions or capabilities. In one passage (pp. 83-84), in which Taylor described NSC machinery and its several advisory bodies, CIA is missing from his evidently careful listing of the various agencies which participate in NSC matters. In the next passage, dealing with JCS planning procedure (pp. 85-86), he does mention the fact, without comment or criticism, that the JCS regularly has an "intelligence evaluation" prepared as one of the normal annexes to its basic planning document, called the JSOP (the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan).
4. Several other passages may be of interest:
  - a. In January 1955, Taylor says that the NSC made its "first" comprehensive review of the 1953 "New Look" defense policy, including the "warning" that the U.S. needed a versatility in weapons and strategy to cope with Communist limited-aggression tactics (pp. 26-27).
  - b. Taylor's proposed article for the "Foreign Affairs" quarterly (for its spring 1956 issue) was abandoned, he says, because of clearance problems in the Defense and State Departments (pp. 43-45, 181-97).

Defense said that his views were in conflict with "approved policy" and would jeopardize our international relations. State's "censor" said that his "warnings" about Communist "successes" in infiltration, subversion, and local aggression were in conflict with the U.S. "line" that the Communists had "at least temporarily abandoned" such tactics "because of their failure" (p. 45).

c. In July 1957, at an NSC meeting, Secretary of Defense Wilson "disregarded" the "general agreement" on the "estimate of probability" of Soviet intentions that the Soviet would use (1) cold-war methods, (2) military conflict short of general war, and (3) general war, in that order (p. 51).

d. Secretary of State Dulles, in October 1957, "for the first time" publicly voiced a loss of confidence in the doctrine of "massive retaliation," in an article in "Foreign Affairs" quarterly (p. 55).

e. In the spring of 1958, Taylor criticizes as unfounded by evidence, certain "predictions" attributed by him to the USAF, that the Soviet was emphasizing its bomber-buildup rather than the ICBM program (p. 68.).

f. Taylor offers as his "personal" estimate, today, that the Soviet will be ahead in armaments "until about 1964 ... unless heroic measures are taken" (p. 131 ff.)

g. He concludes that events in Taiwan, the Middle East, Berlin, and Laos have now "verified" the warnings, predicted "for years" that the Soviet would increasingly use tactics of cold-war provocation (p. 136).

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